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Abstract
We model a successive-generation economy in which parents, motivated by fam-
ily altruism, decide to finance or not their offspring’s human capital accumulation
on the basis of their altruistic motive, their own income and the equilibrium ratio
between skilled labor and unskilled labor wages. The question we ask is how the
growth process shapes the wage inequality and the split of the population in two
classes. We study the transitional dynamics of human capital accumulation and of
income inequality. First, we prove the existence of equilibrium paths. Then we show
that there exists a continuum of steady-state equilibria. We prove the convergence
of each equilibrium path to one of the steady-state equilibrium and describe the
evolution of income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers and income in-
equality among the skilled workers. The former inequality is persistent in the long
run while the latter is not. We also look at the relationship between inequality and
output on the set of steady states and find that this relationship is ambiguous. Fi-
nally, we develop an endogenous-growth version of the model. In this version of the
model the relationship between inequality and the rate of growth is also ambiguous.
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1 Introduction
The understanding of the role of human capital in economic activity has been decisively
spurred by the work of G. Becker (1964). Human capital is a major feature of economic
relations inside the family and, as such, is one of the key concepts for understanding of
the individual decision-making over the life-cycle and the functioning of labor markets.
On their side, macroeconomists and especially economic growth theorists investigated the
role of human capital in determining the growth rate of economies in the short and the
long run1.
Modern growth theory has long been relying on the fiction of the representative agent.
However, societies are patently not homogeneous, whether in incomes, wealth, or many
other dimensions. In a sense, the question of inequality and its link with the growth
process is an old one. The classical argument is that inequality is good for growth because
the wealthy are more patient and accumulate more assets than the poor. Over the last
20 or 30 years, the nexus between inequality and growth has attracted a great deal of
interest. We can distinguish two types of questions about this nexus. The first one is:
“How does inequality affect growth?”, namely do unequal economies perform better than
those more equal? The policy implications of this first type of question are relevant for
policies aiming at redistributing income and wealth among households. The role played by
capital market imperfection in discouraging human capital accumulation has been stressed
by several important contributions (see, e.g., Loury (1981), Galor and Zeira (1993))2.
The second type of question about the inequality-growth nexus is then the following:
“How does the growth process affect in turn inequality?”, namely what is the feedback of
growth into the evolution of inequality across time. This second question is relevant also
for the first one. Indeed, as Aghion et al. (1999) argue, if redistribution creates a virtuous
circle by alleviating credit constraints to human capital accumulation, these policy efforts
might be vain if growth in turn worsen inequalities. A virtuous circle would be more or
less offset by a vicious circle.
This paper deals the inequality-growth relationship by introducing occupational het-
erogeneity. In our model economy workers may occupy positions of different skill levels
and get different wages. As a consequence, educational decisions determine not only the
individual stock of human capital but also influences the choice of occupation and the
wages structure.
Ray (2006) examines equilibrium paths of an economy in which skilled and unskilled
labor are necessary to produce. Each generation decides whether to finance the offspring’s
acquisition of human capital out of a dynastic (Barro, 1974) altruistic motive to finance
educational expenses. Since both skilled and unskilled labor are necessary for produc-
tion, equilibrium wages adjust to insure that each category of labor has positive supply,
i.e. that one share of the population occupies unskilled positions and the other skilled
positions. As a result, inequality inside each generation must emerge. Ray (2006) shows
1To mention but one major contribution, see, e.g., Lucas (1988).
2Other arguments have been put forward to emphasize the negative relationship between inequality
and growth: political economy arguments (Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Bertola (1993), Persson and
Tabellini (1994)), or social conflict arguments (Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Borissov and Lambrecht
(2009)).
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that this intragenerational inequality is persistent in the long run. Moreover there exists
a continuum of steady state equilibria.
In a recent contribution, Mookherjee and Ray (forthcoming) extend and modify Ray’s
(2006) model. They provide a small-open economy model with physical capital, a contin-
uum of occupations, training costs and a mix of utility-based and wealth-based motiva-
tion for bequest. They derive conditions under which the steady state exhibits inequality.
These conditions rely on the share of occupations with high training costs3 being non
degenerate.
Our article is close to Ray’s (2006) and Mookherjee and Ray’s (forthcoming) contri-
bution. Indeed it looks at the evolution and the persistence of inequality when agents
are altruists and face occupational heterogeneity. Its main contribution is the analysis of
the endogenous evolution of inequality between skilled and unskilled workers and among
skilled workers.
This is worth a further comment. Models with skilled and unskilled workers can
be divided in two types. The first type of approach is based on the hypothesis of a
fixed education cost. The skilled workers are those who decide to pay for this cost.
In equilibrium there only are two different levels of human capital and the production
process uses these two types production factors (Galor and Zeira (1993)). The second
approach consists in assuming that education expenditure is a continuous variable and
that individuals decide how much human capital to invest. All workers are then perfect
substitutes in the production process but differ by the number of efficiency units of labor
they own (Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)).
Our model differs from these two approaches. We assume two types of labor, skilled
and unskilled, but skilled workers are not all identical : they can differ by the level of their
human capital. Moreover there is no fixed education cost. Individuals decide to invest in
their offspring’s education by taking into account their own human capital and the ratio
of total wages their offspring would get in skilled and unskilled occupations. Since this
wage ratio is endogenous, this is the channel through which the growth process influences
human capital investment and inequality on the transition and in the long run. In the
literature models combining educational investment and different types of occupations
(e.g. Ray (2006) and Mookherjee and Ray (forthcoming)) typically do not rely on a
dynamic process of human capital accumulation. In these papers education is a flow, not
a stock. Our approach with human capital as a stock allows us to model the influence of
parents’ own human capital stock through the education function4. Moreover within such
a framework we are able to study the dynamics of income inequality among the skilled
workers.
We assume that individuals care about their offspring’s net disposable income and
that there is an accumulative education function. Becker and Tomes (1979) used this
set of hypotheses to analyse the equilibrium distribution of income and intergenerational
mobility. They labeled the approach based on the offspring’s wealth by the term “quality
of the children”. They claimed that the implications in terms of income distribution of this
3Higher than an endogenous threshold.
4In a slightly different setting Schneider (2010) develops a model with diversity of occupations and
parent-child dynamic transmission through a Markovian process: the talent of a child depends on the
talent of her parents through a Markov process)
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approach are similar to those of Barro’s (1974) “dynastic altruism” approach, in which
altruists care about their offsring’s utility. Lambrecht et al (2005) and Lambrecht et al
(2006) studied the properties of fiscal policies under this approach, which they labeled
“family altruism”. They find less clear cut conclusions: pay-as-you-go policies are neutral
but public debt is not. The family altruism approach enables to study the transitional
dynamics of physical and/or human capital5. As an altruistic bequest motive, it is also
preferable to Andreoni’s (1989) joy-of-giving or warm-glow motive because the latter is
insensitive to the economic situation of the beneficiaries of transfers.
To summarize, this paper is based on the threefold assumption of (i) family altruism (ii)
accumulative human capital and (iii) the existence of two distinct occupational choices
(skilled and unskilled jobs). Among skilled agents, there is room for heterogeneity in
human capital and ncome. In that sense it combines (i) the neoclassical approach which
sees human capital as efficiency units of labor whose individual endowments vary across
the skilled workers and (ii) the approach which emphasizes the role of indivisibilities in
occupational choice6.
We study the equilibrium paths along which human capital is accumulated differently
across each generation’s family. The main results are the following. First, we prove that
there exists a unique intertemporal equilibrium path starting from any initial distribution
of human capital. Secondly, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence of stationary equilibrium paths compatible with inequality in income among families
and show that there exist a multiplicity of steady states. At these steady states, one share
of the population permanently supply skilled labor while the remaining share permanently
has zero human capital across generations and supplies unskilled labor. Then the analysis
of convergence shows that any equilibrium path converges to a steady state equilibrium
with persistent inequality between skilled and unskilled agents and equality among the
skilled workers. We numerically illustrate that the long run relationship between inequal-
ity and output is ambiguous. Finally, we propose an endogenous version of the model
by assuming that the productivity of unskilled labor benefits from the accumulation of
human capital. In this version of the model, it is shown that the relationship between
inequality and growth of output is also ambiguous.
The paper starts with the presentation of the model in Section 2. Then the competitive
equilibrium is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 studies steady state equilibria. Section
5 establishes the convergence of equilibrium paths to a steady state equilibrium and
discusses the dynamics of inequality. In Section 6 we discuss the long run inequality-
output relationship. Section 7 develops an endogenous-growth version of our model.
Section 8 concludes.
5We confine our analysis to human capital only.
6Indivisibilities may also come from the educational system like in Chusseau and Hellier (2010).
4
2 The model
2.1 The firms
We consider a closed economy in which, at each time t, the output of the representative
firm, Yt, is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = (Ht)
α(Lt)
1−α,
where Ht is the supply of skilled labor and Lt is the supply of unskilled labor. The wage
rates of unskilled labor and human capital, wLt and w
H
t , are determined by their marginal
products:
wHt = α
(
Lt
Ht
)1−α
, wLt = (1− α)
(
Ht
Lt
)α
.
Output is either consumed or spent on education.
2.2 The households
The economy is modelled as a sequence of successive generations. Each agent lives for
one time period and has one offspring. The set of dynasties is the interval [0, 1]. Each
dynasty is denoted by the variable i. Each agent is endowed with one unit of unskilled
labor force that requires no higher education and a subset of agents are also endowed
with some amount of human capital. We call agents with positive endowment of human
capital “educated” agents and those with zero endowment of human capital “uneducated”
agents.
In dynasty i at time t, the agent’s human capital is denoted by ht(i). This level of
human capital depends on her parent’s human capital, ht−1(i) and on the amount her
parent spent for higher education, et−1(i). We assume that this dependence is described
as follows:
ht(i) = et−1(i)
κ(ht−1(i) + 1)
1−κ, 0 < κ < 1, ∀t ≥ 0. (1)
If the parent of an individual spent nothing on her education, the human capital of this
individual is nil.
Consider the individual belonging to dynasty i and living in period t. During this
period, she supplies inelastically either unskilled labor or human capital. If wLt > w
H
t ht(i),
she suppies one unit of unskilled labor. If wLt < w
H
t ht(i), she supplies ht(i) units of human
capital. If wLt = w
H
t ht(i), she is indifferent in this respect. Thus, her total income is
ωt(i) = max{w
L
t , w
H
t ht(i)}, ∀t ≥ 0. (2)
Total income is divided between consumption ct(i) and educational expenditure for
her offspring et(i). This educational expenditure is motivated by family altruism (see
Lambrecht et al. 2005 and Lambrecht et al. 2006), i.e. by the concern for the offspring’s
total income ωt+1(i) defined by (2) at time t+1. According to (1) at time t+1, spending
et(i) on the offspring’s education determines the latter’s human capital, and thus her total
income.
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The individual’ preferences are defined over consumption ct(i) and her offspring’s
expected total income ωt+1(i). They are represented by the following log-linear utility
function: ln ct(i) + lnωt+1(i). The individual maximizes her utility function under her
budget constraints considering current wage and expectations on next period wages as
given. We state this problem as follows
max
ct(i)≥0,et(i)≥0
ln ct(i) + lnωt+1(i)
under the following constraints:
et(i) + ct(i) = ωt(i), (3)
ωt+1(i) = max{w
L
t+1, w
H
t+1ht+1(i)}, (4)
ht+1(i) = et(i)
κ(ht(i) + 1)
1−κ. (5)
The solution of this problem is characterized by the optimal educational expenditure et(i)
and can be solved in two steps. First we solve the two sub-problems defined by the two
alternatives of the offspring’s income. Second we select the solution leading to the highest
utility. The optimal decision to invest in the offspring’s education is described in the
following proposition :
Proposition 1. The optimal educational expenditure et(i) and the resulting offspring’s
human capital ht+1(i) are determined as follows:
• they are respectively characterized by the following functions: eˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
=
κ
1+κ
ωt(i) and hˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
= γ
(
ωt(i)
)κ(
1 + ht(i)
)1−κ
, with γ = ( κ
1+κ
)κ if
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
1 + κ
>
wLt+1
wHt+1
; (6)
• they are both equal to zero if
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
1 + κ
<
wLt+1
wHt+1
(7)
• there are two solutions, either et(i) = 0 and ht+1 = 0 or et(i) = eˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
and
ht+1(i) = hˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
if
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
1 + κ
=
wLt+1
wHt+1
; (8)
Proof : see appendix A
This proposition reads that the parent’s decision to invest in her offspring’s education
depends on the latter’s occupational choice. If at time t+1 dynasty i individual supplies
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unskilled labor on the labor market, then at time t the parent’s expenditure on education
is nil and all her income ωt(i) is spent on consumption. Hence the offspring’s human
capital, ht+1(i), is also nil. On the contrary, if at time t+ 1 dynasty i individual supplies
human capital on the labor market, then the parent’s expenditure on education is equal
to the fraction κ
1+κ
of her income ωt(i). The rest of the income,
1
1+κ
ωt(i), is spent on
consumption. Thus, the offspring’s human capital is equal to hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
.
At each time t it is convenient to order the set of dynasties in a way such that the
function ht(·) defined on the interval [0, 1] and describing the distribution of human capital
across dynasties be non-decreasing. At the same time it follows from (40) that if for some i
and j, ht(i) ≥ ht(j) and ωt(i) ≥ ωt(j), then hˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
≥ hˆH
(
ωt(j), ht(j)
)
. This give
us the opportunity to order the set of dynasties at time 0 and restrict our consideration to
paths of the economy such that all functions ht(·) are non-decreasing at the initial order.
3 Competitive equilibrium
To study the general equilibrium of this economy we proceed in two steps7. We first study
the time t temporary equilibrium in subsection 3.1 given past variables and expectations of
the future. In subsection 3.2, we then describe the intertemporal equilibrium with perfect
foresight as a sequence of temporary equilibria with some adequate initial conditions and
rule for expectations.
3.1 Time t temporary equilibrium
To define the temporary equilibrium at time t, we consider all past variables and expec-
tations of the future as given. The latter are expectations of the next period wages wLt+1
and wHt+1 and the former are the time t− 1 human capital levels, ht−1(i) ∀i ∈ [0, 1], total
incomes ωt−1(i) = max{w
L
t−1, w
H
t−1ht−1(i)} ∀i ∈ [0, 1], and educational spendings et−1(i)
∀i ∈ [0, 1]. Since these given past variables determine time t human capital levels ht(i)
∀i ∈ [0, 1], we can say that these levels are completely pre-determined by time t − 1
decisions. To be more precise, all we need to know to construct the time t temporary
equilibrium is the function ht(·).
Let us assume that the function ht(·) is non-decreasing and upper semi-continuous
8
and that
∫ 1
0
ht(i)di > 0.
A time t temporary equilibrium is defined by a quadruple of functions
{ωt(·), ct(·), et(·), ht+1(·)}, defined on [0, 1], a pair of prices {w
L
t , w
H
t }, a triplet of aggregate
variables {Lt, Ht, Yt} and a pivotal dynasty i
H
t satisfying the following requirements:
• all agents, households and firms, are at their optima;
• the set of dynasties supplying unskilled labor at time t is the interval [0, iHt ) and the
set of dynasties supplying human capital is the interval [iHt , 1];
7See Hicks (1939) or, more recently Grandmont (1983) for the articulation of these two steps.
8The assumption that the function ht(·) is upper semi-continuous is made for technical reasons, to
specify its values at points of discontinuity.
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• all markets clear.
It should be noticed that the pivotal dynasty iHt dtermines the share of unskilled labor
suppliers in the population. The share of human capital suppliers is respectively 1− iHt .
To make our presentation simple we also impose the following requirement on tempo-
rary equilibrium, which will not lead to any loss of generality:
• ht+1(i) is a non-decreasing upper semi-continuous function defined on [0, 1].
We determine this equilibrium by writing the variables of the above-mentioned tuples
as functions of past variables and expectations. To find a temporary equilibrium at time t
it is sufficient to determine the pivotal dynasty iHt . Knowing it, one can easily determine
the equilibrium values of all other variables.
In equilibrium, the supply of unskilled labor is equal to
Lt =
∫ iH
t
0
1di = iHt , (9)
the supply of human capital is equal to
Ht =
∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di (10)
and human capital and unskilled labor are paid at their marginal products:
wHt = α
(
iHt∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
)1−α
, wLt = (1− α)
(∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iHt
)α
. (11)
Therefore,
wLt
wHt
=
(1− α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iHt
)
.
Also, in equilibrium, we must have
wHt ht(i) ≤ w
L
t , 0 ≤ i < i
H
t ,
and
wHt ht(i) ≥ w
L
t , i
H
t ≤ i ≤ 1,
or, equivalently,
ht(i) ≤
wLt
wHt
, 0 ≤ i < iHt ,
and
ht(i) ≥
wLt
wHt
, iHt ≤ i ≤ 1.
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Therefore, given the time t human capital levels ht(i)∀ i ∈ [0, 1], the time t equilibrium
pivotal dynasty, iHt , is determined by the following conditions:
ht(i) ≤
(1− α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iHt
)
, 0 ≤ i < iHt , (12)
ht(i) ≥
(1− α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iHt
)
, iHt ≤ i ≤ 1. (13)
The integral
∫ 1
iH
ht(i)di is a continuous and non-increasing function of i
H because the
function ht(·) is bounded and non-negative. Therefore,
(1−α)
α
( ∫ 1
iH
ht(i)di
iH
)
is a continuous
decreasing function of iH defined on the interval (0, 1]. It tends to∞ as iH goes to 0, and
its value at iH = 1 is 0.
At the same time ht(i) is a non-decreasing function of i. Therefore, to find the pivotal
dynasty it is sufficient to ”solve” the following equation in iH :
ht(i
H) =
(1− α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
ht(i)di
iH
)
. (14)
If the solution to equation (14) exists, the time t equilibrium pivotal dynasty coincides
with this solution. In this case this dynasty is the one with human capital just equal to
the ratio between unskilled labor wage rate and human capital wage rate and hence for
this dynasty supplying unskilled labor will result in the same income as supplying human
capital:
wLt = w
H
t ht(i
H
t ).
A solution to (14) may not exist because ht(i) is not necessarily continuous. But even in
the case of non-existence there is a unique iHt satisfying (12)-(13). It is given by
iHt = min
{
iH ∈ [0, 1] | ht(i
H) ≥
(1− α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
ht(i)di
iH
)}
.
The above minimum exists because, as noted, (1−α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
ht(i)di
iH
)
is a continuous function
of iH and the function ht(·) is upper semi-continuous by assumption, and hence the set{
iH ∈ [0, 1] | ht(i
H) ≥ (1−α)
α
( ∫ 1
iH
ht(i)di
iH
)}
is closed.
It should be noted that 0 < iHt < 1 because ht(i) <
(1−α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iH
t
)
for all sufficiently
small i > 0 and ht(i) >
(1−α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iH
t
)
for i in the neighborhood of 1.
Knowing iHt , we get Ht, Lt, w
H
t and w
L
t from (9)–(11). Also we are able to determine
the total income of all households:
ωt(i) =
{
wLt , 0 ≤ i < i
H
t ,
wHt ht(i), i
H
t ≤ i ≤ 1.
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Since ht(·) is a non-decreasing upper semi-continuous function and w
H
t ht(i
H
t ) ≥ w
L
t , the
function ωt(·) is also non-decreasing and upper semi-continuous.
With the pairs {ht(i), ωt(i)} ∀i, we can now determine the time t equilibrium educa-
tional expenditures, et(i), i.e. the optimal educational expenditures at equilibrium prices
given expectations on next period wage rates wLt+1 and w
H
t+1. Once this variable is deter-
mined, it will give us the next period distribution of human capital, the ht+1(i)’s. Here
we should notice that the functions et(·) and ht+1(·) are not necessarily uniquely deter-
mined, because for i satisfying (8), et(i) is equal to either 0 or eˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
. However,
this non-uniqueness plays no role in our model, because, as will be shown in the next
subsection, in intertemporal equilibrium non-uniqueness does not appear.
For short, in what follows we identify any temporary equilibrium at time t with the
couple {iHt , ht+1(·)}.
3.2 The intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight
Suppose we are given an initial state of the economy represented by a non-decreasing
upper semi-continuous function h0(·) showing the distribution of human capital across
dynasties at the initial time. We assume that
∫ 1
0
h0(i)di > 0 and define an intertemporal
equilibrium path {iHt , ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 starting from h0(·) as a sequence of temporary equilibria,
such that at each time t each dynasty has perfect foresight, that is, correctly anticipate
time t+ 1 wage rates.
We proceed recursively as follows. Given h0(·), we construct i
H
0 as described in the
previous section. After that, for each t = 0, 1, ..., given ht(·) and i
H
t , we construct ht+1(·)
and iHt+1 simultaneously in a way consistent with the procedure described in the previous
section.
Suppose that the function ht(·) is given, that it is non-decreasing and upper semi-
continuous and that
∫ 1
0
ht(i)di > 0. Suppose further that i
H
t is found as described in the
previous section (if t = 0), or at step t− 1 (if t > 0) and that wLt , w
H
t and ωt(·) are found
as described in the previous section. To find the function ht+1(·), we start with using the
time t+1 human capital function associated with positive investment in education given
by equation (40) in section 2.2, namely hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
. Since the analysis will focus on
the pivotal dynasty and all the arguments of this function depend on i, we re-write it as
a function h˜t+1 of i.
Namely, let the function h˜t+1 : [0, 1]→ R+ be defined by
h˜t+1(i) = hˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
(= γ [ωt(i)]
κ (1 + ht(i))1−κ).
Since ωt(·) and ht(·) are non-decreasing upper semi-continuous functions, h˜t+1(·) is also a
non-decreasing upper semi-continuous function. Moreover,
h˜t+1(i) = γ
[
wLt
]κ
, 0 ≤ i < iHt , (15)
h˜t+1(i) = γ
[
wHt
]κ
ψ(ht(i)), i
H
t ≤ i ≤ 1, (16)
where the function ψ : R+ → R+ is given by
ψ(h) = hκ(h+ 1)1−κ. (17)
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Let further the function Ht+1 : [0, 1]→ R+ be defined by
Ht+1(j) =
∫ 1
j
h˜t+1(i)di. (18)
This function is continuous and decreasing because the function h˜t+1(·) is bounded and
non-negative. It shows the dependence of the aggregate supply of human capital on the
pivotal dynasty. In equilibrium at time t+1 the ratio of the wage rates of unskilled labor
and human capital is endogenously determined by the marginal productivities of these
inputs, which in turn is determined by the relative masses of these inputs. So we have:
1− α
α
Ht+1(i
H
t+1)
iHt+1
=
wLt+1
wHt+1
and, at the same time, from Proposition 1 and the definition of the function h˜t+1(·)
h˜t+1(i)
1 + κ
≤
wLt+1
wHt+1
, 0 ≤ i < iHt+1, (19)
h˜t+1(i)
1 + κ
≥
wLt+1
wHt+1
, iHt+1 ≤ i ≤ 1. (20)
Whereas Ht+1(j)
j
is a decreasing function of j, h˜t+1(i) is a non-decreasing function.
Moreover,
1− α
α
Ht+1(j)
j
>
h˜t+1(j)
1 + κ
for all sufficiently small j > 0 and
1− α
α
Ht+1(j)
j
<
h˜t+1(j)
1 + κ
for all j sufficiently close to 1.
To find the time t + 1 equilibrium pivotal dynasty iHt+1, it is sufficient to ”solve” the
following equation in j:
1− α
α
Ht+1(j)
j
=
h˜t+1(j)
1 + κ
. (21)
If this equation has a solution, it is unique. Since h˜t+1(·) may be discontinuous, the
non-existence of a solution to equation (21) is possible. But even if (21) has no solution,
the time t + 1 equilibrium pivotal dynasty iHt+1 is uniquely determined by the following
conditions:
1− α
α
Ht+1(j)
j
>
h˜t+1(j)
1 + κ
, 0 ≤ j < iHt+1, (22)
1− α
α
Ht+1(j)
j
≤
h˜t+1(j)
1 + κ
, iHt+1 ≤ j ≤ 1. (23)
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It is given by
iHt+1 = min
{
j ∈ [0, 1] |
1− α
α
Ht+1(j)
j
≤
h˜t+1(j)
1 + κ
}
.
The above minimum exists because the function Ht+1(·) is continuous and the function
h˜t+1(·) is upper semi-continuous, and hence the set
{
j ∈ [0, 1] | 1−α
α
Ht+1(j)
j
≤ h˜t+1(j)
1+κ
}
is
closed.
Now we determine ht+1(·) as follows:
ht+1(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H
t+1,
ht+1(i) = h˜t+1(i), i
H
t+1 ≤ i ≤ 1. (24)
Thus, we have proved
Theorem 1. For any initial state h0(·) there is a unique intertemporal equilibrium path
starting from this initial state.
It should be noticed that, unlike temporary equilibrium, non-uniqueness of equilibria
does not appear in intertemporal equilibrium. This is because in the definition of tempo-
rary equilibrium at time t agents take the wage rates at time t + 1 as given, whereas in
intertemporal equilibrium they are determined endogenously. Also it is noteworthy that
in intertemporal equilibrium an agent spend a strictly positive fraction of her income on
education if and only if her offspring will be human capital supplier on the labor market.
4 Steady-state equilibria
Steady-state equilibria are characterized by the feature that the wage rates and the shares
of educated agents supplying human capital on the labor market and uneducated agents
supplying unskilled labor are constant over time and that inside each dynasty children
find themselves in the same position as their parents.
At a steady-state equilibrium, the amount of human capital, h∗, supplied by an agent
from an educated dynasty only depends on the wage paid to one unit of human capital,
wH∗, because h∗ is the solution to the following equation: h = γ(wH∗)κψ(h). Hence, at a
steady-state equilibrium all educated dynasties supply the same amount of it. Therefore
we can define steady-state equilibria as follows.
A couple (iH∗, h∗), iH∗ ∈ (0, 1), h∗ > 0, is called a steady-state equilibrium if the
sequence {it, ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 given by
it = i
H∗, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
ht+1(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H∗, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
ht+1(i) = h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
is an equilibrium path starting from h0(·) defined as follows:
h0(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H∗,
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h0(i) = h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1.
It follows from (10) and (11) that at any steady state equilibrium (iH∗, h∗) the total
supply of human capital, H∗ and the wage rates of unskilled labor and human capital,
wL∗ and wH∗, are given as follows:
H∗ = (1− iH∗)h∗,
wH∗ = α
(
iH∗
H∗
)1−α
= α
(
iH∗
(1− iH∗)h∗
)1−α
, (25)
wL∗ = (1− α)
(
H∗
iH∗
)α
= (1− α)
(
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
)α
. (26)
In a steady state equilibrium the ratio of unskilled labor wage to human capital wage
is given by :
wL∗
wH∗
=
1− α
α
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
, (27)
which is a decreasing function of iH∗ and an increasing function of h∗. As a measure of
income inequality we use the skill premium P ∗. It is defined as the proportion of the wage
earned by an educated individual to the wage of an unskilled individual:
P ∗ =
wH∗h∗
wL∗
.
It follows from (27) that on the set of steady-state equilibria the skill premium is an
increasing function of iH∗:
P ∗ =
α
1− α
iH∗
1− iH∗
.
Let (iH∗, h∗) be a steady-state equilibrium and {it, ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 be the corresponding
equilibrium path. It follows from (15)-(16) that for this path,
h˜t+1(i) =
{
γ(wL∗)κ, 0 ≤ i < iH∗,
γ(wH∗)κψ(h∗), iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1.
Therefore at a steady state conditions (19) and (20) respectively become
γ(wL∗)κ
1 + κ
≤
wL∗
wH∗
(28)
and
γ(wH∗)κψ(h∗)
1 + κ
≥
wL∗
wH∗
. (29)
The first of these inequalities means that the uneducated agents have no incentives to
spend on the education of their offsprings and the second that the educated agents have
such incentives. It is also clear that
h∗ = γ(wH∗)κψ(h∗). (30)
One can easily prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 2. A couple (iH∗, h∗), 0 < iH∗ < 1, h∗ > 0, is a steady-state equilibrium if
and only if for wH∗ and wL∗ given by (25) and (26) respectively, (28)-(30) hold true.
Let us now describe the relationship between the share of uneducated agents in the
population, iH∗, and the human capital accumulated by an educated agent in a steady-
state equilibrium, h∗. It is reasonable to conjecture that this relationship is increasing
because a higher share of uneducated agents can lead to a larger skill premium and wages
of educated individuals and hence to higher individual educational expenditures. The
following lemma says that this conjecture is true.
Lemma 2. There is a smooth increasing function χ : (0, 1) → R+ and numbers L1 and
L2, 0 < L2 < L1 ≤ 1, such that for any i
∗ ∈ (0, 1) and for wH∗ and wL∗ given by (25)
and (26) respectively,
(30) is equivalent to
h∗ = χ(iH∗), (31)
(29) is equivalent to iH∗ ≥ L2,
(28) is equivalent to iH∗ ≤ L1.
Proof: see appendix B
The following theorem describes the structure of steady-state equilibria. It directly
follows from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2.
Theorem 3. There exists a smooth increasing function χ : (0, 1)→ R+ and numbers L1
and L2, 0 < L2 < L1 ≤ 1, such that a couple (i
H∗, h∗) is a steady-state equilibrium if and
only if either
L2 ≤ i
H∗ ≤ L1 (if L1 < 1)
or
L2 ≤ i
H∗ < L1 (if L1 = 1)
and
h∗ = χ(iH∗).
According to Theorem 3, the set of steady-state equilibria is a continuum which can
be parameterized by the share of uneducated agents in the population9.
Another interesting parametrization of the set of steady-state equilibria is that by the
skill premium. This parametrization can help us to explain why all equilibrium values
of the share of uneducated agents lies in the interval [L2, L1]. If i
H∗ < L2, then the
couple (iH∗, χ(iH∗)) is not a steady-state equilibrium because the wage rate of unskilled
labor is so high and the skill premium is so small that even the educated parents have no
incentives to spend a positive fraction of their incomes on the education of their children.
If L2 ≤ i
H∗ ≤ L1, then the skill premium is such that the educated individuals prefer to
see their children educated while the uneducated agents find it too expensive to spend
money on the education of their children. Finally, if iH∗ > L1, the couple (i
H∗, χ(iH∗)) is
not a steady-state equilibrium because the wage rate of unskilled labor is so small and the
skill premium is so high that even the uneducated individuals are ready to spend money
on the education of their children.
9In Ray (2006), the set of steady state equilibria also is a continuum.
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5 Convergence of equilibrium paths
In this section, we first shall prove that starting from any initial state, characterized by
an arbitrary distribution of human capital, the economy converges to a steady state and
we shall provide a graphical illustration of the convergence process.
The following theorem reads that any equilibrium path converge to a steady-state
equilibrium and that the number of uneducated agents does not increase over time (except,
perhaps, at time t = 1).
Theorem 4. For any equilibrium path {iHt , ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 the sequence {i
H
t }
∞
t=1 is non-
increasing (it may be that iH1 > i
H
0 ) and there is a steady-state equilibrium (i
H∗, h∗) such
that
iHt −→t→∞ i
H∗,
ht(i) −→t→∞ h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1.
Proof: see appendix C
Traditionnally in models of economic growth with a representative agent or with home-
geneous generations, there is a unique steady state equilibrium (see for example the Ram-
sey model) or a finite number of steady states (for example the overlapping-generation
model with production). In these models the question of convergence boils down to
connecting initial states with the unique or the finite number of steady state. In growth
models with heterogeneous agents (Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993),
Freeman (1996), Ray (2006) and Borissov and Lambrecht (2009)), there is a continuum
of steady states and the question of convergence is more complex. On the one hand we
cannot determine to which steady state the economy will converge if it starts from a
given initial state. On the other hand for any steady state there is a continuum of initial
distributions of human capital that would lead to the convergence to this steady state.
We develop an example of transition to shed light on the process of human capital
accumulation in the presence of indivisibilities in occupations. Figures 1-5 show the
economy converges to a steady state starting from an arbitrary distribution of human
capital. We shall discuss how the shares of skilled and unskilled workers evolve across
time, how dynasties respond to incentives given by the evolving skill premium and shed
light on the long run division of society into these two categories.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of generation 0 human capital levels. Members of
generation 0 are ordered according to their human capital. We give ourselves an initial
distribution with positive human capital for all individuals with the exception of the
origin.
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Figure 1: Generation 0 human capital distribution
Figure 2 shows how the initial generation, while having positive human capital, splits
into two groups as far as their occupation is concerned. The production process implies
both skilled and unskilled labor. The unskilled occupations can be taken by individuals
with positive human capital but the latter are not more productive in these occupation
than individuals deprived of human capital. Generation 0 individuals with low human
capital (i.e. those below iH0 ) choose to work as unskilled after comparing the respective
total wages of skilled and unskilled labor. Indeed, given the market wage ratio, it is
necessary to have a sufficiently high level of human capital to receive a higher total wage
as a skilled than as an unskilled.
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Figure 2: Division of generation 0 individuals between skilled and unskilled occupations
Generation 0 individuals decide whether to spend or not on the education of their
offspring by comparing the respective expected total wages they would receive in the two
types of occupation10. This is depicted in figure 3. In their reasoning, parents follow their
altrusitic bequest motive and use the human capital production function. This function
brings the influence of parents’ human capital (the dotted line) into the picture.
10The difference between generation 0 choice of their own occupation and the choice of their offspring’s
occupation is that in the former case human capital is given, while in the latter it is a decision variable.
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Figure 3: Generation 1 human capital distribution and switching dynasties
Two categories of families invest in human capital. First, generation 0 parents with
positive human capital and occupying skilled jobs all spend positive amounts on their
offspring’s education. Second, a share of unskilled parents decides to invest in their
children’s education. In figure 3, these families lie in between the time t = 0 pivotal
dynasty, iH0 , and the time t = 1 one. As a result, time t = 1 individuals with positive
human capital and occupying skilled jobs are represented by the two-piece curve on the
right side of the graph. All other families are characterized as follows: parents are unskilled
and children are not educated are occupy unskilled jobs.
The graph in Figure 4 shows the distribution of human capital at time t = 2. The
period before, all parents have made their education investment decision by looking at
the expected wage ratio and their own level of human capital. With respect to time t = 1
more unskilled families start to invest in their offspring’s human capital.
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Figure 4: Generation 2 human capital distribution and switching dynasties at time t = 2
Graphs 3 and 4 show that there can be jumps in children’s human capital for some
unskilled dynasties. Hence these jumps lead to discontinuities in the distribution of human
capital across dynasties at a given period. These jumps raise the following question: do
children’s wages and skill premia also jump for these switching dynasties? The model
answers that there is a jump in children’s total wages for switching dynasties: the total
wages, wHt ht(i) of children in switching dynasties is larger than the total wage w
L
t of
dynasties remaining unskilled. In graph 4 these dynasties are respectively located between
iH2 and i
H
1 and between 0 and i
H
2 . The mechanism behind this result is the following: both
groups of unskilled dynasties (switching and not switching) have the same utility but
parents in switching dynasties sacrifice some consumption (lnwLt > ln[1/(1 + κ)]w
L
t ) and
compensate with higher utility from their children’s income (lnwLt+1 < lnw
H
t+1ht+1(i)). In
equilibrium if a smaller share of dynasties switched, the skilled labor supply would be
marginally lower, the wage of skilled workers would be marginally higher and the utility
under positive educational investment would be higher than utility with zero investment;
as a consequence skilled labor supply would increase and the share of skilled workers in
the population increase. Only in subsequent periods, will the utility of these switching
dynasties be higher than those remaining unskilled.
The last figure (Figure 5) represents a possible steady state of the economy. As
proposition 3 establishes, there is a continuum of steady state equilibria inside the interval
[L2, L1]. In the graph, we choose one of these possible steady states and characterize it by
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the iH∗ pivotal dynasty. At the chosen steady state equilibrium, skilled dynasties share the
same steady level of human capital. This level is reproduced at every period. Unskilled
dynasties steadily reproduce a zero level of human capital. Hence there is persistent long
run inequality at the competititve steady state equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Steady state equilibrium human capital distribution
This graphical example sheds light on the dynamics of income inequality on the tran-
sition to the steady state. Two dynamic processes take place. They regard income in-
equality between skilled workers and unskilled workers (hereafter between-inequality) and
income inequality among skilled workers (hereafter within-inequality).
Even if the economy starts with an equal distribution of human capital, income in-
equality between skilled and unskilled workers appears from the beginning. In subsequent
period the share of skilled workers increases but this does not necessarily imply that
between-inequality increases or decreases. Indeed this depends on the initial distribution
of human capital.
As far as skilled workers are concerned, once a dynasty has joined the share of skilled
workers, its human capital and wage income tend to converge towards a unique level
because of diminishing returns in the education function. This process of equalization is
perturbed by the newcomers dynasties. The latter enter the group of skilled dynasties at
the bottom of the distribution of human capital. However when the process of switching
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from unskilled to skilled occupations stops, within-inequality monotonically decreases and
tends to zero.
The key features of our model11 make it possible to describe such a combination of
the within- and between-inequality dynamics.
6 On the long run output-inequality nexus
Let us now consider the question of what is the relationship between inequality, measured
by the skill premium, and output on the set of steady-state equilibria. The debate on
this issue is not settled. The classical approach suggests that inequality stimulates capital
accumulation and thus promotes economic growth, whereas the modern approach argues
in contrast that for sufficiently wealthy economies equality stimulates investment in human
capital and hence may enhance economic growth. To sketch the broad outlines of this
relationship, it is sufficient to look at the dependence of output on iH∗, because, as noted
above, the skill premium P ∗ is an increasing function of iH∗. The level of output, Y ∗,
corresponding to a steady-state equilibrium (iH∗, χ(iH∗)) is
Y ∗ = [(1− iH∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
χ(iH∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]α[ iH∗︸︷︷︸
+
]1−α.
The signs under the components of Y ∗ indicate the positive or negative dependence of
each component with respect to the steady pivotal dynasty iH∗. Remember that the lower
the steady state pivotal dynasty, the higher the share of skilled workers 1 − iH∗ and the
lower the individual steady human capital χ(iH∗). We can distinguish two features. First
the dependence of unskilled labor with respect to the steady pivotal dynasty is monotonic
and positive: as iH∗ decreases, the contribution of of unskilled labor, [iH∗]1−α, decreases
because there are less and less unskille workers. Second the dependence of total human
capital, (1− iH∗)χ(iH∗), with respect to the steady pivotal dynasty is non monotonic. Let
us contrast two polar situation. First consider a steady state in which the steady pivotal
dynasty is close to the L1 upper bound
12. As a consequence the share of skilled workers
1 − iH∗ is low but the individual steady human capital χ(iH∗) is high. This case is one
with high inequality between skilled and unskilled but the net effect on output depends
on the dominating component, share of skilled or individual steady human capital. To the
opposite, consider a steady state with low iH∗ (close to the L2 lower bound), inequality
is lower but again the net effect on output is ambiguous.
It would be difficult to derive an analytical form of the function [(1 − i)χ(i)]α[i]1−α.
It is clear that the dependence of Y ∗ on iH∗ is quite ambiguous. The shape of the graph
of this function depends on the relative weight of skilled and unskilled labor and on the
parameters of the model, α and κ. The higher α, the higher the elasticity of output with
respect to human capital and therefore the higher the share of human capital income in
11These key features are : (i) human capital is a stock, (ii) there are indivisibilities in occupation.
Other models either have one occupation and different human capital levels or have a fixed education
costs and identical human capital of skilled workers.
12Remember that any steady state must lie in the (L2, L1) interval
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output. The higher κ, the more efficient is parents’ educational expenditure to produce
the offspring’s human capital. These parameters are key in the relationship between
inequality and growth in the long run. Indeed, when κ is high, educational expenditure
is so efficient to produce human capital that a lower steady level of spending is needed
to sustain long run growth. Similarly, when α is high, the efficiency of human capital to
produce output is so high that a lower level if it is needed to have high output
Our computational experiments13 show that this dependence on the interval [L2, L1]
can be of an inverted U-shaped form or increasing.
On Fig. 1 we present L1, L2 and the graph of [(1− i)χ(i)]
α[i]1−α on the segment [0, 1]
at α = 0.4, κ = 0.5. On [L2, L1] the function [(1− i)χ(i)]
α[i]1−α has an inverted U-shaped
form.
Figure 6
The interpretation of this pattern of dependence runs as follows. If we start from a
very unequal steady state, i.e. close to L1, and move towards a more equal one in which
the share of skilled workers is higher, aggregate output increases because the positive
effect playing through the increase of the share of skilled workers 1 − iH∗ dominates the
other two negative effects, through the share of unskilled iH∗ and through the individual
steady human capital χ(iH∗). If we continue the move towards a more equal steady state,
the two negative effects end up dominating the positive effect on Y ∗
A different pattern of dependence appears if the elasticity of output w.r.t. human
capital α is slightly lower and the efficiency of educational expenditure κ higher. On Fig.
2 we present L1, L2 and the graph of Γ(i) on the segment [0, 1] at α = 0.3, κ = 0.96. On
[L2, L1] the function [(1− i)χ(i)]
α[i]1−α increasing.
13The computations have been performed with Matlab.
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Figure 7
Again let us examine the effects of a move towards a more equal distribution of human
capital on the level of output. As iH∗ decreases the decrease in output induced by χ(iH∗)α
and [iH∗]1−α always dominates the increase induced by (1− iH∗)α
7 Endogenous growth
In this section we propose an endogenous growth version of our model. To do this, we
introduce an endogenously formed variable reflecting the state of technology at time t,
At. An increase in its value leads (i) to a higher effectiveness of unskilled labor and (ii)
promote accumulation of human capital. In its turn, the accumulation of human capital
contribute to the growth of the value of this variable through a macroeconomic externality.
More precisely, our assumptions are as follows. The output at time t, Yt, is given by
Yt = H
α
t (AtLt)
1−α.
Therefore the wage earned by each agent supplying unskilled labor on the labor market
is wLt = (1− α)H
α
t (AtLt)
1−α.
The human capital of an agent of dynasty i at time t, ht(i), depends not only on the
human capital of her parent, ht−1(i) and the amount of money the parent spent for her
higher education, et−1(i), but also on the state of technology at time t− 1, At−1:
ht(i) = et−1(i)
κ(ht−1(i) + At−1)
1−κ, 0 < κ < 1. (32)
As for the formation of At, we assume that
At = Φ(Ht−1, At−1),
where Φ : R2+ → R is a continuous homogeneous of degree one concave function.
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Thus, the variable At i) shows the efficiency of unskilled labor and ii) plays the role
of an input in the educational production function. Its value can grow over time through
the accumulation of human capital.
The behavior of individuals is the same as in the case of the exogenous growth model
with the only difference that (1) is replaced by (32). The temporal and intertemporal
equilibria are also defined in practically the same way as above. The difference is that a
temporal equilibrium at each time t is described not by a couple {iHt , ht+1(·)}, but by a
triple {iHt , At+1, ht+1(·)} satisfying the requirements formulated in Subsection 3.1 and the
equation At+1 = Φ(
∫ 1
0
ht(i)di, At). Clearly, an initial state of an intertemporal equilibrium
path is determined by a couple {A0, h0(·)}. The existence of an intertemporal equilibrium
paths is also proved in the same way.
As for a steady-state equilibrium, it is defined as a triple {iH∗, g∗, h∗}, iH∗ ∈ (0, 1),
h∗ > 0, such that the sequence {iHt , At+1, ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 given by
iHt = i
H∗, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
At = (1 + g
∗)t, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
ht+1(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H∗, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
ht+1(i) = At+1h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
is an equilibrium path starting from the initial state {A0, h0(·)} given by A0 = 1,
h0(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H∗,
h0(i) = h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1.
In this definition, g∗ is an equilibrium balanced growth rate.
As in the case of exogenous growth, it is not difficult to show that any equilibrium
path {iHt , At+1, ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 converges to a steady-state equilibrium in the following sense:
iHt −→t→∞ i
H∗,
ht(i)
At
−→t→∞ h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1,
At+1
At
−→t→∞ 1 + g
∗.
The structure of the set of steady-state equilibria is described in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. There is a smooth increasing function χ : (0, 1)→ R+ and numbers L1 and
L2, 0 < L2 < L1 ≤ 1, such that a triple (i
H∗, 1 + g∗, h∗) is a steady-state equilibrium if
and only if either
L2 ≤ i
H∗ ≤ L1 (if L1 < 1)
or
L2 ≤ i
H∗ < L1 (if L1 = 1)
and
h∗ = χ(iH∗), 1 + g∗ = Φ((1− iH∗)h∗, 1) (33)
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What does the endogenous growth version of our model tell about the nexus of income
inequality and the rate of economic growth? In this version of the model, the nature of the
relationship between income inequality and the rate of growth on the set of steady-state
equilibria can be illustrated by the graph of the dependence of (1 − iH∗)χ(iH∗) on iH∗
implied by (33). We already know that these two components of the rate of growth have
opposite dependence on iH∗.
Similar results can be derived from a computational exercise as in the exogenous
version.The parameter κ plays a same role. Our simulations show that on the interval
[L2, L1] the rate of growth of output can be a decreasing function of i
H∗ if κ is low (see
Figure 8 with α = 0.4, κ = 0.5); for intermediate values of κ, the pattern of relationship
has an inverted U-shape form (see Figure 9 with α = 0.7, κ = 0.8) and for high values of
κ the rate of growth of output is an increasing function of iH∗ (see Figure 10 with α = 0.3,
κ = 0.96). Figs. 8-10 present graphs of (1 − i)χ(i) on the segment [0, 1] and indicate L2
and L1 for different values of parameters α and κ.
Figure 8: α = 0.4, κ = 0.5.
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Figure 9: α = 0.7, κ = 0.8.
Figure 10: α = 0.3, κ = 0.96.
8 Conclusion
To contribute to the analysis of the relationship between inequality and growth we de-
veloped a model characterized by (i) human capital accumulation, (ii) a family altruism
motive, and (iii) a twofold occupational choice between skilled and unskilled positions.
We showed how the initial income distribution evolves across time both between skilled
and unskilled agents and among skilled agents. The growth process contributes to increase
the share of skilled workers on the transition. However in the long run, income inequality
between skilled and unskilled workers persits while the inequality among skilled workers
disappear.
The steady state equilibrium itself is actually a continuum and for each of these steady
state a different wage inequality and splitting prevails. We show that the relationship
between the location of the steady state pivotal dynasty, and hence the long run wage
inequality, and the level of output (or the rate of growth of output) is ambiguous.
One possible extension of this approach could be the analysis of the respective merits
of redistributive and educational policies in dealing with the long run relationship be-
tween inequality and growth. How would these policies change the growth process and
the inequality between skilled and unskilled workers? And how would inequality among
skilled agents be affected? This model provides a tool to jointly answer these two related
questions.
Finally, another extension would consist in relaxing the closed economy assumption
and to assume that, in a North-south framework globalization increases the supply of un-
skilled labor intensive goods. This is likely to change the results, especially the dynamics
of inequality inside the northern countries. Indeed the effects of the increase in the share
of skilled workers displayed by our closed-economy model would be couteracted by the
globalization process.
26
References
[1] Aghion, P., E. Caroli and C. Garcia-Penalosa (1999), Inequality and economic
growth: The perspective of new growth theories, Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, Vol XXXVII (December 1999), pp. 1615-1660
[2] Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1996), Income distribution, political instability, and
investment. European Economic Review, 40, 1203-1228.
[3] Alesina, A. and Rodrik, A. (1994), Distributive politics and economic growth. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 109, 465-490.
[4] Andreoni, J., (1989), Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ri-
cardian equivalence. Journal of Political Economy 96, 1447–1458.
[5] Banerjee, A. and A. Newman, (1993) ‘Occupational choice and the process of devel-
opment, Journal of Political Economy 101, pp 274-298
[6] Barro, R.J.(1974). Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy
82, 1095–1117.
[7] Becker G. (1964), Human capital. A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special
reference to education, First Edition, NBER, New York.
[8] Becker, G. S. and N. Tomes, (1979), An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of
Income and Intergenerational Mobility, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
87, N6 (Dec., 1979), 1153-1189
[9] Bertola, G. (1993), Factor shares and savings in endogenous growth, American Eco-
nomic Review, 83, 1184-1198
[10] Borissov, K. and S. Lambrecht (2009), Growth and Distribution in an AK-model
with Endogenous Impatience, 39 (1), Economic Theory pp. 93-112
[11] Chusseau, N. and J. Hellier, Educational systems, Intergenerational Mobility
and Segmentation, MONDES Working Paper (abstract on http://inequality-
globalisation.univ-lille1.fr/papers.php)
[12] Freeman, S., (1996) Equilibrium income inequality among identical agents, Journal
of Political Economy , 104(4), pp 1047-1064
[13] Galor, O., Zeira, J., (1993), Income distribution and macroeconomics. Review of
Economic Studies, 60, 35-52.
[14] Glomm G. and B. Ravikumar, (1992), Public versus Private Investment in Human
Capital: Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, vol 100, n41, pp 818-834.
[15] Grandmont, J.-M., (1983), Money and value: a reconsideration of classical and neo-
classical monetary theories(Econometric Society of Monographs in Pure Theory,
Number 5). Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
[16] Hicks, J., (1939), Value and capital, Oxford: Clarendon press,
[17] Lambrecht S., Michel Ph., Vidal J-P., (2005), Public pensions and growth. European
Economic Review; 49 (5); 1261-1281.
27
[18] Lambrecht, S., Michel Ph., Thibault E., (2006), Capital accumulation and fiscal
policy in an OLG model with family altruism. Journal of Public Economic Theory
8(3); 465-486.
[19] Loury, G.C., (1981), Intergenerational transfers and the distribution of earnings,
Econometrica, vol. 49, n4, 843-867
[20] Lucas R.E. Jr. (1988), On the Mechanisms of Economic Development, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 22, pp. 3-42.
[21] Mookherjee, D. and D. Ray, Inequality and Markets: Some Implications of Occupa-
tional Diversity, American Economic Journal, forthcoming
[22] Persson, T. and Tabellini, G., (1994), Is inequality harmful for growth? Theory and
evidence. American Economic Review, 84, 600-621.
[23] Ray, D., (2006), On the Dynamics of Inequality. Economic Theory, 29, 291-306
[24] Schneider A., 2010, Redistributive taxation vs. education subsidies: Fostering equal-
ity and social mobility in an intergenerational model, Economics of Education
review, 29, pp 597-605
A Proof of Proposition 1
The dynasty i time t individual problem, namely
max
ct(i)≥0,et(i)≥0
ln ct(i) + lnωt+1(i),
under the following constraints:
et(i) + ct(i) = ωt(i), (34)
ωt+1(i) = max{w
L
t+1, w
H
t+1ht+1(i)}, (35)
ht+1(i) = et(i)
κ(ht(i) + 1)
1−κ, (36)
can be rewritten as follows:
max
0≤et(i)≤ωt(i)
ln(ωt(i)− et(i)) + ln(max{w
L
t+1, w
H
t+1et(i)
κ(ht(i) + 1)
1−κ}). (37)
This problem can be solved in two steps. First we solve the two sub-problems defined
by the two alternatives of the max function,
max
0≤et(i)≤ωt(i)
ln(ωt(i)− et(i)) + ln(w
L
t+1), (38)
and
max
0≤et(i)≤ωt(i)
ln(ωt(i)− et(i)) + ln(w
H
t+1et(i)
κ(ht(i) + 1)
1−κ), (39)
and then we select the solution leading to the highest utility.
The solution to problem (38) is et(i) = 0. If at time t+1 dynasty i is going to supply
unskilled labor on the labor market, then at time t its expenditure on education is nil
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and all income ωt(i) is spent on consumption. Hence the human capital of this dynasty
at time t+ 1, ht+1(i), is also nil. The value of problem (38) is
V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
= lnωt(i) + lnw
L
t+1.
The solution to problem (39) is
et(i) = eˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
=
κ
1 + κ
ωt(i).
If at time t + 1 dynasty i is going to supply human capital on the labor market, then at
time t its expenditure on education is equal to the fraction κ
1+κ
of its income ωt(i). The
rest of the income, 1
1+κ
ωt(i), is spent on consumption. Thus, the endowment of human
capital of agent that belongs to dynast i and lives at time t+ 1 is equal to
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
= γ
(
ωt(i)
)κ(
1 + ht(i)
)1−κ
, (40)
where
γ =
(
κ
1 + κ
)κ
.
The value of problem (39) is
V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
= lnωt(i)− ln(1 + κ) + lnw
H
t+1 + ln hˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
.
It is clear that if V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
< V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
, then the unique solution
to problem (37) coincides with the solution to problem (38). If V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
>
V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
, then the unique solution to problem (37) coincides with the solution
to problem (39), and if V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
= V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
, then the solutions of both
(38) and (39) are solutions to (37). It is easily checked that
V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
T V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
⇔
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
1 + κ
T w
L
t+1
wHt+1
.
B Proof of Lemma 2
First we show that on the set of steady-state equilibria there is a monotonically decreasing
relationship between the equilibrium pivotal dynasty iH∗, which shows the share of uned-
ucated agents in the population, and the amount of human capital, h∗, supplied by each
educated agent. Second, we show that the set of equilibrium values of iH is an interval.
Let us first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6. 1) There is a smooth increasing function χ : (0, 1) → R+ such that for any
i ∈ (0, 1),
h = γ
[
α
(
i
(1− i)h
)1−α]κ
ψ(h)⇔ h = χ(i). (41)
This function satisfies
χ(i)→ 0 as i→ 0 and χ(i)→∞ as i→ 1. (42)
2) 1−i
i
χ(i) monotonically decreases from ∞ to (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ as i increases from 0 to 1.
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Proof. 1) Given that ψ(h) = hκ(h + 1)1−κ, we can rewrite the first equation in (41)
as
h = γακ
(
i
1− i
)(1−α)κ
hακ(h+ 1)1−κ,
or, after dividing both sides by hακ(h+ 1)1−κ, as
h1−ακ
(h+ 1)1−κ
= γακ
(
i
1− i
)(1−α)κ
. (43)
The LHS of the last equation is continuous and increasing in h, tends to 0 as h→ 0 and
to +∞ as h tends to +∞ since 1− ακ > 1− κ. The RHS of this equation is continuous
and increasing in i, tends to 0 as i → 0 and to +∞ as i → 1. It is then obvious that for
any i there exists a solution to (43) in h. To complete the proof, denote this solution by
χ(i) and notice that the both properties in (42) hold true.
2) After some rearrangement of (43) we can get
1− i
i
χ(i) = (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ
(
1 +
1
χ(i)
)(1−κ)/(1−α)κ
.
Since χ(i) monotonically increases from 0 to ∞ , 1−i
i
χ(i) monotonically decreases from
∞ to (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ as i increases from 0 to 1. 
Because of (25) and Lemma 6, equation (30) can be rewritten as (31), where χ(·) is
the function introduced in Lemma 6. Thus, the amount of human capital supplied by
each educated agent is an increasing function of the share of uneducated agents in the
population.
Also, by (27) and (30), we can rewrite (29) as
h∗
1 + κ
≥
1− α
α
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
,
or, equivalently, as
iH∗ ≥ L2 =
(1− α)(1 + κ)
(1− α)(1 + κ) + α
.
Let us now rewrite (28) as
γ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ
(
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
)ακ
≤
1− α
α
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
,
This inequality can be re-written as
γ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ ≤
1− α
α
(
1− iH∗
iH∗
h∗
)1−ακ
=
1− α
α
(
1− iH∗
iH∗
χ(iH∗)
)1−ακ
or, after substituting (31) as
γ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ ≤
1− α
α
(
1− iH∗
iH∗
χ(iH∗)
)1−ακ
. (44)
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By Lemma 6, 1−i
i
χ(i) monotonically decreases from ∞ to (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ as i increases
from 0 to 1. Therefore, if(
αγ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ−1
) 1
1−ακ
≥ (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ ,
then (44) is equivalent to
iH∗ ≤ L1, (45)
where L1 is the solution to the following equation in i:
γ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ =
1− α
α
(
1− i
i
χ(i)
)1−ακ
.
If (
αγ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ−1
) 1
1−ακ
< (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ ,
then (44) holds for all iH∗ ∈ (0, 1).
To complete the the proof of Lemma 2, it is necessary to show that L2 < L1. To do
this, let
h∗∗ = χ(L2),
wH∗∗ = α
(
L2
(1− L2)h∗∗
)1−α
, wL∗∗ = (1− α)
(
(1− L2)h
∗∗
L2
)α
.
We have
h∗∗
1 + κ
=
γ(wH∗∗)κψ(h∗∗)
1 + κ
=
wL∗∗
wH∗∗
.
It follows that
wH∗∗h∗∗ >
wH∗∗h∗∗
1 + κ
= wL∗∗.
Hence
γ(wL∗∗)κ
1 + κ
<
γ(wH∗∗h∗∗)κ
1 + κ
<
γ(wH∗∗)κ(h∗∗)κ(h∗∗ + 1)1−κ
1 + κ
=
γ(wH∗∗)κψ(h∗∗)
1 + κ
=
wL∗∗
wH∗∗
.
It is clear that (28) fulfills as a strict inequality if and only if (45) fulfills as a strict
inequality. Therefore the last chain on inequalities implies L2 < L1. 
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C Proof of Theorem 4
It is sufficient to prove that for any equilibrium path {iHt , ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 the sequence {i
H
t }
∞
t=1
is non-increasing.
Let {iHt , ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 be an equilibrium path. Show that
iHτ+1 ≤ i
H
τ , τ = 1, 2, . . . . (46)
Let us take a τ > 0. It follows from (16) that
Hτ+1(i
H
τ ) = γ
(
wHτ
)κ ∫ 1
iHτ
ψ(hτ (i))di, (47)
(the functions ψ(·) and Hτ+1(·) are defined by respectively (17) and (18)).
Since ψ(h)
h
=
(
h+1
h
)1−κ
is a decreasing function of h > 0, we have
ψ[hτ (i)]
hτ (i)
≤
ψ[hτ (i
H
τ )]
hτ (iHτ )
, iHτ ≤ i ≤ 1.
This inequality can be rewritten as
ψ[hτ (i)] ≤
ψ[hτ (i
H
τ )]
hτ (iHτ )
hτ (i), i
H
τ ≤ i ≤ 1.
Taking account of (47) and (24), we get
Hτ+1(i
H
τ ) ≤ γ
(
wHτ
)κ ψ[hτ (iHτ )]
hτ (iHτ )
∫ 1
iHτ
hτ (i)di
= γ
(
wHτ
)κ ψ[hτ (iHτ )]
hτ (iHτ )
∫ 1
iHτ
h˜τ (i)di = h˜τ+1(i
H
τ )
Hτ (i
H
τ )
h˜τ (iHτ )
and hence
Hτ+1(i
H
τ )
h˜τ+1(iHτ )
≤
Hτ (i
H
τ )
h˜τ (iHτ )
.
Suppose now that iHτ < i
H
τ+1. It follows from (22) applied to t = τ and j = i
H
τ that
α
1− α
1
1 + κ
iHτ <
Hτ+1(i
H
τ )
h˜τ+1(iHτ )
.
At the same time, from (23) applied to t = τ − 1 and j = iHτ ,
Hτ (i
H
τ )
h˜τ (iHτ )
=
α
1− α
1
1 + κ
iHτ .
The last three inequalities imply iHτ > i
H
τ , which is a contradiction. This contradiction
proves (46).
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to note that the sequence {iHt }
∞
t=1 is bounded
from below and therefore converges to some iH∗. It is no difficult to check that iH∗ > 0
and the required steady-state equilibrium is the couple (iH∗, h∗), where h∗ = χ(iH∗). 
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